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CULTURAL CONFIGURATIONS OF VALUES
All cultures are infused by or even rooted in certain values. Although those
values are generally recognised in all societies, they are diversely ranked or
proritised in different human groups and different perceptions partly account
for cultural diversity as not all values can be equally upheld in any community
or by any individual. Though value universalism in a strict sense is
unachievable, we can all agree on a pluralistic mutual understanding of and
tolerance for diversity.
CHENYANG LI
This article develops a pluralist understanding of cultural diversity, whichmay be called “culture as a configuration of values”. It has the followingcomponents:
1. Primary human values that are similar across cultures.
2. Some of these primary values conflict or compete with one another.
3. Conflicting values are configured in ways appropriate to circumstances in society.
An important aspect of cultural difference is that even though cultures have
primary values in common, they may not give the same weight to these values.
4. In the world and sometimes within the same society, more than one value
configuration can be justified and different value configurations are likely to
persist. Cultures and societies change over time, but they may never come to
uniformity on a universal configuration of values.
According to this view, a moderate moral universalism can be justified with respect
to its claim that various societies share similar moral values and a moderate moral
relativism can be justified with respect to its claim that more than one pattern of
moral practices can be justified. This phenomenon can be explained in terms of
different configurations of similar values. As far as values are concerned, human
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C U LT U R A L  C O N F I G U R A T I O N S  O F  V A L U E S
beings across cultures are both similar and diverse, in different ways. While we
share enough commonality to work with one another, we also have legitimate
grounds in value configurations for cultural diversity. Understanding this important
dimension of culture is crucial for handling cultural differences and for the peaceful
coexistence of cultures in today’s world.
HUMAN VALUES
The nature and ontological status of values is a subject of philosophical debate.Some people hold that values are subjective, while others think they are
objective. Some values are considered intrinsic, while others are considered
instrumental. Some values are moral, while others are amoral, such as economic
and aesthetic values. This article establishes an understanding of values at a general
level without getting into these disputes. Although it mainly focuses on moral
values, the general theory developed,
applies to non-moral values as well
(Grice, 1991 and Wiggins, 1987).
Values are represented in concepts
that stand for ideals and what are
considered worthwhile in life. They
guide and motivate people’s pursuits.
Values are not specific goods that people
acquire—they are the reasons underlying
people’s pursuits of those goods. For
example, someone gives to charity because he holds that generosity is a good value
and that poverty and misery are not. When we praise a person’s action as courageous,
we use the value of “courage” to evaluate the action and to encourage similar actions.
Values are connected in various ways and may be called the knots in the web of
practical reasoning. For instance, kindness, compassion and generosity are related
concepts. We often call the embodiment of a value in a person “virtue”, that is, a
trait which instantiates a value or values. What is considered virtuous reflects the
values in a culture.
Human beings across cultures
are both similar and diverse, in
different ways. While we share
enough commonality to work
with one another, we also have
legitimate grounds in value
configurations for cultural
diversity.
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C H E N Y A N G  L I
The first claim of this article is that, in general terms, primary human values are
similar across cultures. One difficulty in cross-cultural studies of values is that value
terms used in different cultures are not precise. Values as formulated in particular
cultures are not “natural kinds” and do not conform to a universal mould. To avoid
unnecessary disputes, one may say that values across cultures are “similar” rather
than the “same” even though some may accept a stronger claim that primary human
values across cultures are the same. This first claim also holds true with subcultures,
though this article does not draw a line between cultures and subcultures.
Understandably, some may find this claim sweeping and in need of empirical
evidence, which can be found in studies such as the World Values Survey by Ronald
F Inglehart, University of Michigan (available at, http://
www.worldvaluessurvey.org). This
article is not an empirical study but for
the sake of argument, the first claim may
be treated as a hypothesis and its validity
understood in the context of the entire
thesis. Nevertheless, some reasons in
support of its plausibility include the fact that primary human values are similar
across cultures because human values answer to human needs and basic human
needs, in general terms, are similar across cultures. The particular forms of these
needs may be culture-specific. Most Chinese desire tea whereas many Americans
drink coffee; the poor in a mountain village somewhere may rely on sweet potatoes
as their main source of food whereas people in Europe routinely eat wheat or beef;
while some people see priests for their psychological needs, others see psychiatrists.
However, basic needs remain the same in general terms and basic human values
respond to those needs.
We may call the basic values “primary values”. This essay does not set a specific
scope for primary human values. Suffice it to say that these are a cluster of high-
order common values one would associate with the good life, such as “knowledge”,
“kindness”, “health”, “wealth”, “bravery”, “friendship”, “respect”, “temperance”,
“strength”, “liberty”, etc. Primary values are expressed in terms of general concepts
and are not culture-specific, even though they can be translated into culturally
specific terms. In a way, primary values are comparable to Michael Walzer’s “thin”
Values are not specific goods that
people acquire—they are the
reasons underlying people’s
pursuits of those goods.
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moral ideals, which he argues are universal (Michael, Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral
Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1994). Alternatively, this view resembles that of David Hume, who argues
in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Part II, Section II, 1751) that
social virtues are recognised because of their beneficial tendencies to promote the
interests of the human species and to bestow happiness on human society.
The first claim can be supported by the theory of evolution, which maintains
that human beings are biological beings that have evolved to this day, that as a
biological species we have no higher purpose than survival and that our basic activities
can be explained, directly or indirectly, in terms of this sole ultimate purpose.
According to this view, human beings’ basic biological and psychological needs are
formed through the same evolution
process and therefore these needs are the
same or similar across societies. Without
these needs being satisfied, the human
species will not be able to survive and
they are the ultimate sources of human
values. We value bravery because bravery
enables us to protect our kin or
ourselves. An evolutionary biologist
once stated that humans value the beauty
in flowers because flowers were sources of food for our ancestors. Blossoming wild
flowers are themselves edible or are usually found along with other plants that can
be used as food.
This, however, does not mean that every individual or group across cultures
embraces all these values. Some individuals have blind spots in their value framework
for various reasons. They are “abnormal” in society. A serial killer may not value
respect for human life. An extreme loner may not value friendship. People of a
particular school of thought may not value wealth. However, a society as a whole
cannot have blind spots about primary values, though it may rank a value
considerably lower than another society. Nor can one deny that social practices
vary from culture to culture. Some of these differences can be explained by divergent
applications of values. The same values may be manifest in different ways. In one
Primary human values are
similar across cultures because
human values answer to human
needs and basic human needs,
in general terms, are similar
across cultures. The particular
forms of these needs may be
culture-specific.
C U LT U R A L  C O N F I G U R A T I O N S  O F  V A L U E S
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society, being a good community member (a primary value) implies attending
church regularly, while in another it does not. In one culture, parents take their sick
children to medical doctors whereas in another parents take them to shamans for
religious rituals. Nevertheless, parents in both societies share the value of their
children’s health, even though they pursue it in different ways. Other differences in
the realisation of values are mostly explained in terms of different assessments of
the worthiness of a practice in pursuit of values. To many people, bullfighting in
Spain is cruel. One may ask how can
people value animal cruelty? A
reasonable explanation is that people in
Spain do not value animal cruelty—they
value sportsmanship, bravery, national
spirit, entertainment and their cultural
tradition. In bullfighting, they see these
values that they share with the rest of
the world, more than the suffering of
the animal. They may not deny that
bullfighting causes pain to the animal,
but they see it as minimal and
worthwhile, given the positive values
realised in practising this ritual sport. Therefore, different moral practices across
cultures do not prove that cultures do not share primary values.
COMPETING AND CONFLICTING VALUES
The second claim is that some primary values conflict or at least compete witheach other. Isaiah Berlin in The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the
History of Ideas (Henry Hardy (Ed), New York: Alfred A Knopf, p 12, 1991)
argues, “values can clash”. This is because values are vectorial. If we imagine a moral
space with values in it, each of these values carries both a force and a direction with
respect to one another. This vectorial character of values prompts a person to act in
a certain way. Because some values compete on the same dimension, they may
conflict with one another. Each value points in a direction for a person to act.
Human beings’ basic biological
and psychological needs are
formed through the same
evolution process and therefore
these needs are the same or
similar across societies. Without
these needs being satisfied, the
human species will not be able
to survive and they are the
ultimate sources of human
values.
C H E N Y A N G  L I
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When a person acts in one direction, he or she cannot act in another direction with
equal force. For example, a person’s own freedom and loyalty to someone else may
conflict. “Freedom” and “loyalty” are valued in all societies, even though the ways
and degrees in which they are practiced vary considerably. Some people may not
feel the tension or conflict between individual liberty and loyalty and can freely
choose to be loyal to someone. However, as long as loyalty holds one from breaking
away, there will be a tension between these values. Suppose Peter has served a political
leader Larry for a long time and after a successful career, Larry is slowing down and
Peter is thinking about starting his own operation. As Larry has treated Peter well
and clearly still needs his assistance, Peter
is torn in opposite directions— “loyalty”
to Larry and “freedom” for himself.
Another example is that one cannot live
a life full of exciting adventures as well
as a life of safety and tranquillity. This
kind of conflict exists in a person as well
as in society. According to Berlin (ibid),
“total liberty for wolves is death to the
lambs, total liberty of the powerful, the
gifted, is not compatible with the rights to a decent existence of the weak and the
less gifted. … Equality may demand the restraint of the liberty of those who wish
to dominate”.
Some values conflict because they compete for time and resources in their
realisation. Just as one may find it impossible to develop fully both one’s scholarship
and athletic potentials, one may find it difficult to be a responsible caring mother
to one’s children and at the same time, a “Mother Teresa” to help the poor all over
the world. In Four Essays on Liberty, (London, Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, p 168, 1969) Berlin writes, “The world that we encounter in
ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally
ultimate and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must
inevitably involve the sacrifice of others”.
Conflicts of values generate moral dilemmas, which are situations where one is
caught in an action that intersects with two or more seemingly equally important
Some primary values conflict or
at least compete with each other.
When a person acts in one
direction, he or she cannot act
in another direction with equal
force. For example, a person’s
own freedom and loyalty to
someone else may conflict.
C U LT U R A L  C O N F I G U R A T I O N S  O F  V A L U E S
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values and pursuing one value undermines the pursuit of another. In “From Freedom
to Liberty: The Construction of a Political Value” (Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol
30, No 1 pp 3–26, 2001) Bernard Williams discusses the notion of “a cost in
liberty”—in the interests of equality or justice, sometimes we have to put restrictions
on liberty. It can be argued that there is a cost in any value within a value system.
When we allow a large degree of free speech, there is a cost in other values such as
public decency. Recent debates in the United States on allowing unlimited internet
access at public libraries (including access to pornography) illustrate one such
example. Lifestyle, thrift and elegance may pull us in opposite directions—one
may incur a cost on the other. These costs occur because values are related in such a
way that they compete for space within a value framework.
While many authors agree with
Berlin that values conflict (Charles
Taylor, “Plurality of Goods”, Bernard
Williams, “Liberalism and Loss” and
Thomas Nagel, “Pluralism and
Coherence” in Mark Lilla, Ronald
Dworkin and Robert Silvers, The Legacy
of Isaiah Berlin, New York: New York
Review of Books, 2001) others deny
such conflict. Ronald Dworkin (“Do Liberal Values Conflict?” in Lilla, Dworkin,
and Silvers, ibid) argues that liberal values do not conflict if articulated in the right
way and instead of writing a blank cheque on liberty, liberals should define liberty
as a specific kind of right with its own limits. Thus, Dworkin sees the need to
define liberty with “limits” precisely because liberty conflicts with other values. We
need to assign these values their proper places, otherwise these values will step on
each other. Dworkin sometimes seems to imply that values may conflict as one
value may be “overridden by other values” (Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice
of Equality, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University
Press, p 2, 2000). The very idea of a possibility for one value overriding another
implies that these values compete on the same dimension and can conflict with
one another.
Lifestyle, thrift and elegance may
pull us in opposite directions—
one may incur a cost on the
other. These costs occur because
values are related in such a way
that they compete for space
within a value framework.
C H E N Y A N G  L I
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VALUE CONFIGURATION
As individuals we deal with value conflicts one decision at a time. We appeal toour moral philosophy as formulated in our culture for guidance, but how
does culture handle conflicting values. Obviously, if society is to retain all good
values they have to be brought together in a meaningful way. This is achieved
through the formation of a value pattern within a culture. Value patterns reflect
the established relationships between various values, including competing and
conflicting values. This third claim is the process of knotting various values together
into a value pattern “value configuration”. This is a complex, long and on-going
process, through which values are prioritised and organised in a systematic way to
reach what is deemed an ideal balance of values in a particular culture. Value
configuration consists of two modules. First, values are ranked with respect to one
another through prioritisation. Differing cultures do not prioritise values the same
way. For example, one culture may hold loyalty to be a higher value than individual
freedom whereas another culture may hold otherwise, even though they both endorse
these values. While Confucianism places the observance of the general rules of li
(propriety) above spontaneity, Daoism arguably does the opposite. Second, value
configuration also indicates how much priority or importance one value is assigned
vis-à-vis other values. It is possible that two cultures both hold value x to be more
important than value y, yet they may disagree on how much importance separates
these two values. This separation of values admits degrees. For example, in the US,
freedom of speech is arguably given more importance vis-à-vis public decency than
in many other countries.
Placing one value above another does not necessarily mean that one value always
“trumps” another. For example, Confucians hold that one’s duty to parents is more
important than one’s duty to a job. This, however, does not mean a person cannot
do anything else whenever there is a conflict between his duty to his parents and his
duties on the job. It depends on circumstances, on how much stake each side has in
an action, etc. If the parents want to watch a movie together while the person needs
to attend an important meeting at work, a reasonable Confucian would say the
person should attend the meeting. However, if the parents need to be taken to
hospital because they are not well, then perhaps the meeting can be skipped. This is
C U LT U R A L  C O N F I G U R A T I O N S  O F  V A L U E S
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similar to saying that although gold is more precious than silver, the value of one
hundred ounces of silver still outweighs that of one ounce of gold. The point is
that when there is an ultimate conflict, between the sacrifice of one’s parents and
the sacrifice of one’s job, the Confucian value configuration tends towards fulfilling
one’s duty to one’s parents.
A configuration of values represents a conception, vision and ideal of a good
life. It is a systematised, conceptual response to society’s needs to survive and flourish.
Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue (Second Edition, Notre Dame, Indiana: University
of Notre Dame Press, p 222, 1984) speaks of tradition as an argument “about the
goods which constitute that tradition”. While articulating a particular value
configuration, a cultural tradition provides rationales as to why certain values are
important or more important than others. As a conception, value configuration
cannot be precisely quantified. Relationships between values in a value configuration
are usually loosely established. Different
cultures may share a similar value
configuration while manifesting it in
different customary forms.
Anthropological studies reveal different
customary cultural forms as
embodiments of values and comparative
moral philosophy sheds light on
different value configurations. Attempts to articulate, justify, or reform a value
configuration can be found in moral philosophy as well as in the social sciences.
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is a good example of value configuration, so is John
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1971). Researches in the social sciences such as the World Values
Survey give a good idea of different value configurations across cultures and reflect
existing or emerging value configurations in societies. Often in the same society,
there exists more than one value system and hence more than one configuration of
values. This is the case when a general culture encompasses subcultures. In ancient
China there were value configurations represented by Confucianism and Daoism.
In the US today, to some extent the debate between liberalism and
communitarianism represents different configurations of values.
A configuration of values
represents a conception, vision
and ideal of a good life. It is a
systematised, conceptual res-
ponse to society’s needs to survive
and flourish.
C H E N Y A N G  L I
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Value configuration is not a conscious decision by the people of a society. It is
a spontaneous process, usually influenced by factors such as geographical
circumstances and historical contingencies. People in harsh environments may value
endurance as an important virtue, as it is crucial for them to survive and flourish,
while people of a hunting society may place a high value on physical strength. A
powerful and charismatic leader may seize a historic moment to articulate a new
value configuration and change the direction of a nation. The September 11 terrorist
attacks in the US provided an occasion for Americans to shift their value focus
towards security and social control at the cost of individual liberty. If terrorism
against the US persists, this shift in value configuration may become long-term.
This is an example of the reconfiguration of values.
Different cultures are usually embedded with different value configurations.
Ancient Greek philosophers gave
prominence to wisdom, courage,
moderation and justice among their
primary values. Confucians put ren
(benevolence), righteousness, propriety,
wisdom and trustworthiness at the
centre of their culture. It would be a
mistake for us to think that the Greeks
simply did not value benevolence, or the
Confucians did not value justice. They did but they ranked these values differently
from their counterparts. Similarly, it is not that the communitarians today do not
value individual liberty—they do but not to the same degree as the liberals, or the
libertarians. In addition, it is not that the libertarians do not value equality, they do
but not to the same degree as the communitarians. One may wonder if it would
have been better if the Greeks had valued love and care more or if the Confucians
had valued justice more? Would it be better if the communitarians valued individual
liberty more and the libertarians valued equality more? After all, all agree that these
values are good values. The answer is, yes—they could value these respective values
more, but not without affecting their prioritisation of values and the weight they
give other values. As varieties of values in a culture are configured together, the
assigned weight of each value is not independent of others. Therefore, increasing
Value configuration is not a
conscious decision by the people
of a society. It is a spontaneous
process, usually influenced by
factors such as geographical
circumstances and historical
contingencies.
C U LT U R A L  C O N F I G U R A T I O N S  O F  V A L U E S
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the allocation of importance for one value inevitably affects the share given to
other values.
The inevitable cost of pursuing one value incurring in other values makes it
impossible to have absolute values. While people may think some values like human
life are absolute, they are not. Millions of people die of AIDS or cancer each year.
If society invests more to enhance medical research, many lives may be saved.
However, there will be a cost in doing so, in economic as well moral terms. It
would interfere with other important things that we also value. Many people think
that the value of human rights is absolute. It is not. It is a severe violation of
human rights when we send innocent people to prison for crimes they have not
committed. Yet it happens. If we as a
society invest more in training our
police force and legal personnel better,
we could significantly reduce this type
of human rights violations, but we do
not do so. This is not because we do
not value innocent people’s human
rights. It is mostly because there would
be a cost to other things we also value.
We also want national security,
assistance to the poor, better healthcare and so forth. After the September 11 terrorist
attacks, rhetoric among American politicians is that “no cost is too high for national
security”. They are wrong—the cost for national security can be too high. This is
because the value in security has a cost that can interfere with other important
things that are valued, which we are not willing to go beyond the limit for. In value
configurations, some values are taken as significantly more important than others,
but there is no single value that “trumps” all other values in absolute terms.
The characteristics and vitality of a value system lie in its specific value
configuration that answers to the particular needs of a society. This is why synthesising
value systems, is not always the best way for cultural improvement. Berlin in Four
Essays on Liberty (ibid) maintains, “the very concept of an ideal life, a life in which
nothing of value need ever be lost or sacrificed, in which all rational (or virtuous, or
As varieties of values in a culture
are configured together, the
assigned weight of each value is
not independent of others.
Therefore, increasing the
allocation of importance for one
value inevitably affects the share
given to other values.
C H E N Y A N G  L I
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otherwise legitimate) wishes must be capable of being truly satisfied—this classical
vision is not merely utopian, but incoherent”.
It is incoherent because some primary values necessarily conflict and we cannot
satisfy one without negatively affecting others. For example, one may think that
the Daoist emphasis on spontaneity is a good thing as is the Confucian emphasis
on observance of the general rules of li (propriety) and one may want to have both.
However, as a value system configured in a certain way, it can be either weightier
on spontaneity or on observance of general rules, or weigh both equally. There
cannot be a value configuration that makes both a priority to each other. In this
sense, a Confucian–Daoist value configuration is a contradiction. It is not impossible
to produce a value configuration that stands between Confucianism and Daoism.
However, such a system would be
neither Confucian nor Daoist and
would lack the strengths and
characteristics of either system.
Reforming a culture involves
changes in its value configuration. This
is usually accomplished through intra-
cultural dialogues and controversies.
One important aspect of Martin Luther’s Reformation Movement was that by
challenging Papal authority, Luther shifted the source of authority away from the
papacy to individual believers. In other words, one consequence of Luther’s
movement was to value centralised power less—which in Christianity was the
papacy—and to value local and individual self-determination more. When Confucius
first articulated his humanistic vision, he made ren (benevolence) a central value
against such values as (military) strength. Besides changes in value configuration,
another important aspect of cultural change is changing symbolisms, namely the
change of customary forms through which pursuits of values are manifested. That
is a subject study mainly for anthropologists.
The mutual cost between values is often overlooked. In their attempt to
“improve” a cultural tradition, people sometimes elevate a value to a higher status
to meet new challenges. This is done through the introduction of a new or “foreign”
value, even though the “new” value is usually a re-articulation of a native value that
In value configurations, some
values are taken as significantly
more important than others, but
there is no single value that
“trumps” all other values in
absolute terms.
C U LT U R A L  C O N F I G U R A T I O N S  O F  V A L U E S
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so far had been placed low in its value configuration. In doing so, while they see the
positive side of the change, they are usually oblivious of the “cost” in other values
involved in the change. For example, when the Song-Ming Neo-Confucians made
Confucianism more universalistic, there was a cost to the family-centredness of
Classic Confucianism. Another example is the current attempt to democratise
Confucianism. Some authors have tried to elevate “democratic values” within
Confucianism, like William Theodore de Bary (The Liberal Tradition in China,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). This move carries an inherent cost
to other traditional values and if overdone, may undermine the vitality of the
traditional Confucian value system.
Some authors write as if they can have things both ways without any cost.
They want to have their cake and eat it too. They commit what I call “the mat
vendor’s fallacy”. Growing up in a
mountain village in northeast China, I
used to attend farmers’ market with my
grandfather. One day, we were looking
for a bed mat made of crop stalk skins,
diagonally woven together into a
rectangle shape. Because of this their
length and width was not strictly fixed.
At the market, we found one vendor
with mats of good quality but his mats
were not long enough for us. In an
attempt to sell us his mats, the vendor
held one side of the mat and shook it—
the mat became longer. When my grandfather pointed out that now it did not
have adequate width, the vendor simply turned the mat by ninety degrees and
shook it again—the mat became wider. I laughed at the vendor. Perhaps he was so
eager to sell his mats that he did not realise that he could not have it both ways.
Some authors today often remind me of that mat vendor. The fact is that
democratising Confucianism has a cost and the cost to the Confucian traditional
values may be too exacting. If we cannot have it both ways within a value system,
we need to decide which way to take.
In their attempt to “improve” a
cultural tradition, people
sometimes elevate a value to a
higher status to meet new
challenges. This is done through
the introduction of a new or
“foreign” value, even though the
“new” value is usually a
rearticulation of a native value
that so far had been placed low
in its value configuration.
C H E N Y A N G  L I
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In today’s world, moral disagreements across cultures are more on the priority
of values than on values per se and divergent configurations of values across cultures,
rather than values per se, are the primary source of today’s resistance to moral
universalism. The issue of human rights is a good example. While first-generation
human rights emphasise social and political rights, second-generation human rights
give equal weight to economic and cultural rights. Some advocates of first-generation
rights reject or downplay the legitimacy of second-generation rights and vice versa.
Most people accept the value of both rights even though they disagree on their
prioritisations or importance. Article 10 of the 1993 Bangkok Declaration of Human
Rights reaffirms, “the interdependence
and indivisibility of economic, social,
cultural, civil and political rights and the
need to give equal emphasis to all
categories of human rights”.
Balanced as it is, this configuration
of values (rights) does not give as much
priority to social and political rights as
advocates of first-generation human
rights do. Even though sometimes
people misjudge or overlook the values
of certain practices and may change their evaluations, it is undeniable that cross-
cultural moral disagreements are often caused by differences in the priorities of
values in different value systems. This can also be said about tensions and conflicts
between the justice and care perspective in ethics. These two ethics share similar
values, but different configurations—while justice ethics prioritise justice, care ethics
prioritise care (Li, 2008).
THE PERSISTENCE OF DIFFERING VALUE CONFIGURATIONS
The fourth claim is that more than one value configuration can be justified anddifferent value configurations are likely to persist. The persistence of diverse
value configurations can be explained and justified by two accounts. First, there are
different configurations of values in part because configuring a value system is not
Even though sometimes people
misjudge or overlook the values
of certain practices and may
change their evaluations, it is
undeniable that cross-cultural
moral disagreements are often
caused by differences in the
priorities of values in different
value systems.
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a purely logical process. Value configuration is never determined by reason alone
but by various other factors including sentiment and tradition. Rationalists argue
that reason is the foundation of moral values. According to Immanuel Kant, one
should be able to form morals on the sole basis of reason. That rationalism contains
at least a grain of truth can be seen from the fact that we often reason with ourselves
and with one another to establish a moral path. An American philosopher once
stated that after reading Peter Singer’s powerful argument on animal liberation
(Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals (New York: New
York Review/Random House, 1975) she
quit eating meat. The power of reason
in moral value formation is evident and
the rational approach to moral values
may be found in many cultures. The
Golden Rule is an example. Even
though emotions may also be involved
in practicing the Golden Rule, it
primarily relies on reason to figure out
the appropriate course of action (Jeffrey Wattles, 1996). One may be inclined to
do one thing, but deliberation on the Golden Rule may lead one to do another.
Sentimentalists, on the other hand, believe that our sentiments or feelings
determine our moral values. For example, David Hume in “Moral Distinctions
not Deriv’d from Reason”, A Treatise of Human Nature (Part I, Section I, 1739–
40) argues that ultimately it is how we feel that determines moral rights and wrongs.
Hume holds that rules of morality “are not conclusions of our reason” and that “’tis
in vain to pretend, that morality is discover’d only by a deduction of reason”.
Furthermore, reason cannot motivate moral and virtuous behaviours either, because
reason is “inactive in itself” and “reason has no influence on our passions and action”.
Sentimentalism can find support as one reflects on one’s own morals. We often
follow our instinctive feelings in making moral decisions, even though our feelings
are shaped and influenced by our social environment. One example is the issue of
abortion. The rational approach rarely works in changing a person’s position on
abortion. In the end, it is how one feels about it that determines one’s position and
C H E N Y A N G  L I
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our feelings toward the matter are largely formed by our upbringing and shaped by
our environment.
Traditionalists believe that our morals are formed within traditions. MacIntyre
maintains that without tradition, one would not be able to determine the moral
and the virtuous. He argues that the histories of individual agents can be understood
only within a setting in which they are situated. Otherwise, a history of the human
agent becomes “unintelligible” (After Virtue, ibid, p 206–7). For him, an individual’s
life is a part of a tradition. Only within
the context of a tradition can the goods
be defined and pursued (ibid, p 222).
MacIntyre writes: “we need to discover
a conception of rational enquiry as
embodied in a tradition, a conception
according to which the standards of
rational justification themselves emerge from and are part of a history in which
they are vindicated by the way in which they transcend the limitations of and
provide remedies for the defects of their predecessors within the history of the
same tradition” (Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame, Indiana: University
of Notre Dame Press, p 7, 1988). Accordingly, tradition is the source and the
home of rationality. Different traditions have different rationalities or “all reasoning
takes place within the context of some traditional mode of thought” (MacIntyre,
After Virtue, ibid, p 222). For traditionalists, therefore, rationality is constituted
within tradition.
The truth is that human values are shaped and reshaped by all three elements—
reason, sentiment and tradition. We reason with people to make them realise that
certain things are more important than others. We react to a situation of moral
significance according to how we feel about it and living within a tradition, we
inherit values from earlier generations and transform and pass them on to future
generations. Our value formation, though changing over time, is a result of all
three processes. Besides reason, sentiments and tradition, we can also add such
factors as geographical conditions and particular historical events. All these factors
involved in value configuration make the existence of diverse value patterns natural,
Globalisation has significantly increased cross-cultural influences on value
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configuration, but it does not eliminate local factors. People of various cultural
traditions may reason in different ways. They may feel differently about certain
things and follow different trajectories in perpetuating their traditions. Diverse
value configurations are most likely to continue. The persistence of different value
systems can also be explained by another important element of the moral life,
namely the indeterminacy of value efficacy in human affairs with respect to our
moral decisions. This means that because of the complexity and uncertainty in
human affairs, configured values do not always determine the outcomes of human
actions even though we act in pursuit of these values. Due to this indeterminacy, it
is virtually impossible to prove a value configuration to be superior to others,
except in extreme cases.
Philosophers like Plato searched for certainty in human life. In his realm of
Reality, Forms “blended” (or “configured”) together in a logical way like mathematical
symbols. In the Sophist, through the mouth of the Stranger, Plato tells us that
Forms blend together like the letters of the alphabet for which grammar governs
which letters can and cannot be
conjoined (253a). For Forms, logic
governs which are consonant and which
are incompatible with one another
(Sophist, 253c). The correct blending of
Forms constitutes the hierarchical
structure of the reality of Forms. A
philosopher’s job is to determine the
science or logic of the blending of Forms, the most important being that of
Dialectic. Two things should be noted with Plato’s realm of Forms. First, according
to him there is only one correct way of Form-blending and the hierarchical structure
of the Forms is ultimately ruled by the Good. Second, Plato does not make a
distinction between fact and value in his realm of Forms. What is said of facts can
also be said of values. Consequently, for Plato there is one correct way of systemising
values in the realm of Forms or a single correct way of value-configuration. This
uniquely correct value-configuration is the basis for his idea of grasping the technè
for the moral life. In the Protagoras Plato shows us that to rule out tuchè or luck in
life, human learning should aim at grasping the technè. This is the knowledge and
C H E N Y A N G  L I
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skill that enables an individual to systematically manage one’s life. In other words,
because there is one objectively correct value-configuration, the moral person must
know such a reality and manage one’s life accordingly.
Plato is wrong not only because there is no realm of Forms but also because
there is no one objectively correct value-configuration. We humans cannot escape
uncertainty in our moral lives. Often we choose to do certain things, particularly
something moral, because we want to produce desirable outcomes. However, often
we do not know if our actions will produce the desired outcomes, particularly in
the long run. If a student fails to get into law school and feels bad about it, should
he keep trying? If he stops trying, he may
miss the train and ruin his future as a
good lawyer. However, if he gives it up,
it may turn out to be a good thing as he
may find a better niche in the world for
himself and lead a happy life. Thomas
Nagel in “Moral Luck” (Daniel Statman
(Ed), Moral Luck, Albany: State
University of New York Press, p 61, 1993) identifies decisions under uncertainty as
one sort of moral luck. “Moral luck” here refers to the unpredictability and
uncertainty of the outcomes of our moral actions (for discussions of moral luck in
a broad sense, see Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, New York: Cambridge University
Press 1981 and Statman, ibid). This is not the sense in which Aristotle uses the
term, for whom moral luck includes one’s birth, physical appearance and even the
kind of children one has. Nagel’s concern is mainly with moral responsibility and
worthiness but moral luck has further implications. Because uncontrollable factors
contribute to the outcomes of our actions, whether a moral choice is good or bad
for the expected outcome depends at least in part on luck.
Because of moral luck, we cannot possibly find one particular value system
that best answers all our moral questions. For example if a wife finds her husband
becoming an abusive alcoholic, one option for her is to stay in the marriage and try
to save it by helping her husband change for the better—another option is divorce.
She is likely to hear different voices in her head. One voice comes from moral
values such as commitment, relationship, family responsibility to the children,
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love and so forth. Another voice comes from values such as independence, autonomy,
liberty and freedom. These voices pull her in opposite directions, even though they
are all good values. What should she do? Which voice should she listen to? If she
listens to the first voice, she will stay in the marriage, at least for a while. The
husband may reform himself and the couple may live happily ever after, or it may
be just a waste of the woman’s time. By choosing to stay in the marriage, she may
end up suffering more and missing major opportunities for a better life. If she
listens to the second voice, she may get away from her incurably abusive husband
and start a new and better life, or she
may lose the chance to save an otherwise
salvageable marriage and cause
tremendous hardship and pain to herself
and her children. Utilitarian calculus
based on statistics does not help here
because each situation is different. Most
of us would agree that it is unadvisable for her to divorce her husband the first time
he got drunk and called her names. Most of us would also think it unwise to stay
in the marriage trying to change him after a prolonged period of abuse. If she wants
a divorce right away under the name of individual freedom when her husband
starts to be abusive, we may want her to listen more to the voice of commitment,
relationship and family responsibility. If she does not get out of the marriage under
the name of commitment even after a long period of abuse, we may want her to
listen more to the voice of individual freedom and autonomy. If this happens in a
society, where there are two predominant configurations of values—one a kind of
liberalism and the other a kind of communitarianism—the system of the liberal-
oriented configuration would encourage her to get out of the marriage earlier than
the one that is communitarian-oriented.
In reality, most people would need to make a decision somewhere between too
early and too late. Which voice should the woman listen to more? Because of
moral luck, there is no perfect formula for one to follow. Suppose the woman is at
the mid-point of being too early and being too late, which of the competing voices
should she listen to? While a “liberal” would say that she should listen to the second
voice and get out of the marriage, a “conservative” would say that she should listen
C H E N Y A N G  L I
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to the first voice and try to salvage the marriage. Who is right? This is often
determined more by luck than by the legitimacy of moral values. The matter here
is not only one of a desirable outcome but also of getting things right. In other
words, one does not have to depend on a utilitarian presupposition of the moral
good to deliberate on whether the woman should or should not seek a divorce
from her abusive husband.
Because of value indeterminacy, we cannot know for sure which value or value
system will lead us to the desired outcome in a particular case. In one case, listening
to the liberal voice may produce a good outcome, while in another the
communitarian voice may produce a good result. Following one value in a moral
dilemma may not always lead to the
desired outcome. If that were the case,
one single moral value system would
have won the day long ago. Because
we are human and because there is
moral luck in our lives, we have to
struggle and waver between various
values and sometimes between value systems. The Chinese have long been known
for practicing Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism simultaneously. They subscribe
to different value systems alternately. Understanding the role of moral luck in
people’s moral decision-making process may help us make better sense of such a
practice.
Because of value indeterminacy, we cannot possibly find one single value system
that answers all our moral questions. However, this is not to say that all value
configurations are equally valid. Extreme value configurations, like the one Friedrich
Nietzsche outlined, would neither facilitate human survival nor get a hold of society
nor last. Consequently, all major cultural traditions that have endured the test of
time are well balanced to answer human needs, even though they do so in different
ways. In this regard, Charles Taylor writes, “it is reasonable to suppose that cultures
that have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of
diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time—that have, in
other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the admirable—are almost
certain to have something that deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is
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accomplished by much that we have to abhor and reject” (Amy Gutmann,
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, pp 72–3, 1994).
An instrumentalist view of value configurations may be best, in which the
good or bad is more a matter of efficacy rather than truth or falsity. Because value
configuration is heavily influenced by local factors such as tradition and historical
events, differing value configurations can be justified under different circumstances
and are likely to persist.
CONCLUSION
Finally, if this account of cultural value plurality is correct, the world may nevercome to accept one single value configuration. The tremendous success of the
West in the last century has made people wonder whether humankind has finally
come to “the end of history”. In other words, humankind has finally realised that
the Western liberal democratic value configuration is the only viable value system
for the entire humankind and this values
system will be embraced throughout the
world (Francis Fukuyama, “The End of
History?”, National Interest, Vol 16, pp
3–18, 1989). If this means the entire
world will come to accept the same value
configuration—this will not happen.
Circumstances that influence value
configurations can never be uniform
across the world. Diverse geographical,
social and historical circumstances provide conditions for value diversity and make
it impossible for there to be one single value configuration to suit the needs of all
peoples under diverse social and cultural circumstances. Cultures change over time,
but they do not change in the same direction and in the same way. Therefore, they
may never come to a consensus on a universal configuration of values.
The world is large enough for a variety of value configurations. If cultures with
divergent value configurations do not converge into one single configuration, what
C H E N Y A N G  L I
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do they do as they encounter one another? According to John Gray “Conflicts
between incommensurate ways of life are settled by achieving a modus vivendi
between them” (“Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company” in Maria Baghramian
and Attracta Ingram (Eds), Pluralism: The Philosophical and Politics of Diversity,
London and New York: Routledge, pp 85–102, 2000). The status of modus vivendi
is one that different ways of life or value configurations put up with one another
even though they do not agree on important issues. One such example is
Confucianism and the value system of liberal democracy. As long as Confucianism
does not provide a better alternative to the democratic way of producing public
officials through popular election, it has to accept it as a reality, even though it sees
liberal democracy as seriously flawed.
According to Berlin, we should have learned this lesson long ago from
romanticism. “(A)s a result of making clear the existence of a plurality of values, as
a result of driving wedges into the notion of the classical ideal, of the single answer
to all questions, of the rationalisability of everything, of the answerability of all
questions, of the whole jigsaw-puzzle conception of life, (romantics) have given
prominence to and laid emphasis upon the incompatibility of human ideals”.
He concludes, “But if these ideals are incompatible, then human beings sooner
or later realize that they must make do, they must make compromises, because if
they seek to destroy others, others will seek to destroy them and so, as a result of
this passionate, fanatical, half-mad doctrine, we arrive at an appreciation of the
necessity of tolerating others, the necessity of preserving an imperfect equilibrium
in human affairs, the impossibility of driving human beings so far into the pen
which we have created for them, or into the single solution which possesses us, that
they will ultimately revolt against us, or at any rate be crushed by it” (The Roots of
Romanticism, Henry Hardy (Ed), Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
p 147, 1999).
We should now finally understand that the vitality of cultures should not be
underestimated. If cultural value configurations are largely legitimate, the only way
to reach and maintain world peace is to find ways for cultures to co-exist with one
another.
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